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The Point of a Points System:
Skilled
Highly
Attracting
Immigrants the United States
Needs and Ensuring Their Success
ABSTRACT

In a globalizing world, labor is an increasingly mobile and
competitive resource. Responding to this changing labor market,
countries like Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia have
adopted points systems with the goal of attracting talented,
highly skilled immigrants. In the United States, however, much
of the national focus on immigration remains on deterring
illegal immigration rather than attractingimmigrants that the
United States needs to remain competitive in a globalized
world. But attractingskilled immigrants is only one ingredient
to a successful points system; a country must also ensure those
immigrants are successful and use their talents to the fullest
potentialpost-entry. This Note proposes the United States enact
its own points system, but with a narrower goal than other
systems: attracting highly skilled immigrants, while ensuring
their success in the United States.
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1. POINTS SYSTEMS: AN IMMIGRATION INNOVATION
Traditionally, sovereign nations have enjoyed wide latitude in
determining whom to welcome into their lands. After all, drawing
lines in the sand to delineate "us" from "them" is one of the most
important rights that make up sovereign power.' How nations decide
to exercise this sovereign power, however, has undergone a dramatic
change in the past quarter century-changing both the means and
the ends of immigration policy. 2
The "globalizing" world now views humans as a form of capital to
be captured like any other resource. 3 In response, countries have
begun implementing immigration points systems to better capture
this potential resource. 4 Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia
have developed their points systems to attract skilled migrants.5 In

1.
See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2006) ("[A] democracy must

have the power to shape and preserve itself .. . [and] to grant or refuse membership to
newcomers."); Joy M. Purcell, A Right To Leave, but Nowhere To Go: Reconciling an
Emigrant'sRight To Leave with the Sovereign's Right To Exclude, 39 U. MIAMI INTERAM. L. REV. 177, 178 (2007) (noting that the right to control who enters a country goes
to the very heart of sovereign autonomy).
2.
See Paschal 0. Nwokocha, American Employment-Based Immigration
Program in a Competitive Global Marketplace: Need for Reform, 35 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 38, 59-61 (2008) (noting that a globalizing world has changed the way countries
utilize immigration policies).
See id. at 59-60 ("In the contemporary global economy, human capital is
3.
also increasingly mobile so both states and companies must now compete for talent in a
worldwide market.").
4.
See Chris Gafner & Stephen Yale-Loehr, Attracting the Best and the
Brightest: A Critique of the Current U.S. Immigration System, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
183, 187 (2010) (noting that since 2000, nearly two dozen countries have implemented
serious immigration reforms to capture human capital).
5.
See id. at 187-91 (discussing Canada's and the United Kingdom's
immigration points systems); see also Stephen Yale-Loehr & Christoph HoashiErhardt, A Comparative Look at Immigrationand Human CapitalAssessment, 16 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 99, 118-19 (2001) (discussing Australia's "skilled migration" system).
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contrast, the United States has stood still, choosing to retain its old
employment-based immigration regime. 6
Points systems all share a similar goal of attracting human
capital in a procedurally simple manner that, in theory, increases the
overall wealth of the receiving country.7 As the name suggests, points
systems use a rubric of point categories to determine an immigrant's
eligibility for entry.8 Predetermined amounts of points are awarded
for attributes that the receiving country determines are indicators of
human capital, such as advanced degrees, work experience, and
language proficiency. 9
I In addition to enhancing a country's wealth, points systems also
offer procedural simplicity and transparency.' 0 The receiving country
benefits from the efficiency and reduced costs of a simplified
admissions procedure, while the prospective immigrant avoids a
costly expenditure of time and effort navigating a bureaucratic maze
of immigration policy."
This new focus on human capital marks a major shift in
immigration policy that has traditionally been dominated by family
reunification, humanitarian, and other noneconomic goals. 12 This
immigration innovation, however, also raises new concerns. Points
systems may be in tension with both human rights and free-market
ideals, which generally advocate for less restrictive immigration
policies.' 3 There is also concern that points systems are harmful to
the receiving country's labor market if the systems are conceived of as
a device for human-capital accumulation without regard to the

Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 5, at 129-31 (noting the United
6.
States considered adopting a points system, but the idea was not legislated).
7.
See id. at 100 ("[T]he purpose of selecting economic-stream migrants is to
increase the host country's wealth and to achieve a net economic gain for the entire
population.").
See Nwokocha, supra note 2, at 50-55 (explaining how the points system
8.
works in the United Kingdom and Canada).
9.
See id. at 50-51 ("Applicants score points based on their attributes,
including age, education, qualifications, previous earnings, and experience in the
United Kingdom; their English language abilities; and their funds available for fiscal
self-maintenance.").
10.
See Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt,. supra note 5, at 108 (noting that a
points system enhances transparency and simplicity "in that it allows the migrant to
assess his or her own chances of being able to immigrate" and allows policymakers and
voters to be "better able to understand how immigrants are being selected").
11.
See id. (providing a table of "the composition of Canada's immigrant stream
as well as the planned levels of immigration").
12.
See id. at 100 (discussing how the goals of points systems are distinct from
family reunification and humanitarian immigration systems).
13.
See Tomer Broude, The Most-Favoured Nation Principle, Equal Protection,
and Migration Policy, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 553, 556-63 (2010) (discussing the
interaction between economic theory and human rights in immigration policy).
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receiving country's labor needs. 14 Ultimately, however, a points
system is effective in increasing the number of skilled immigrants,
who not only fill labor shortages, but also start new businesses and
generate new jobs and wealth.' 5
First, this Note outlines examples of points systems as
implemented in Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, and
then briefly introduces the current economic-immigration scheme in
the United States as a counterpoint to those systems. This Note then
analyzes potential problems that a points system can create. Finally,
this Note concludes the United States should implement a points
system of its own and makes suggestions for implementing a
succes .^ul points system that could avoid some of the pitfalls of points
systems abroad.

II.

GETTING THE "IN" IN CANADA, AUSTRALIA, THE UNITED KINGDOM,
AND THE UNITED STATES

Employment-based immigration is controlled through points
systems in Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom.' 6 While
these point systems share similar characteristics, 17 their differences
are important. This Part introduces each of these countries' points
systems and contrasts those systems with the employment-based
immigration system of the United States.
A. Canada'sPoints System
Canada led the world in adjusting its immigration policies to
better capture human capital by implementing its points system.' 8

See infra note 181 and accompanying text (suggesting that a points system
14.
can create underemployment if the immigrant's skills and the receiving country's labor
needs do not coincide).
See AnnaLee Saxenian, Brain Circulation: How High-Skill Immigration
15.
Makes Everyone Better Off, BROOKINGS (2002), http://www.brookings.edu/research/
articles/2002/12/winter-immigration-saxenian (using Silicon Valley as an illustration of
how economic openness and a large population of skilled immigrants may foster
transnational entrepreneurship, improve communication across borders, and enhance
trade and investment flow).
16.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing points systems in
Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom).
17.
See infra Part IIA-C (discussing points systems in Canada, Australia, and
the United Kingdom).
See Gafner & Yale-Loehr, supra note 4, at 187-88 (citing DEMETRIOS G.
18.
PAPADEMETRIOU, WILL SOMERVILLE & HIROYUKI TANAKA, MIGRATION POLICY INST.,
HYBRID IMMIGRATION-SELECTION SYSTEMS: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ECONOMIC

MIGRATION SCHEMES 17 (2008), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/
transatlantic/HybridSystems.pdf) (noting that Canada was the first to implement a
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Points are awarded to prospective immigrants for various factors. 1 9
Many of these factors directly relate to the prospective immigrant's
impact on the labor market, such as whether an applicant has
20
arranged employment and the applicant's prior work experience.
Canada awards several points for human-capital attributes, including
education, language proficiency, and age. 2 1
Prospective immigrants must obtain sixty-seven points to be
eligible for a visa. 22 An applicant gains points under various points
categories that have a maximum point value. 23 For example,
completion of secondary school earns an applicant five points out of a
possible twenty-five under the education category.24 Other major
points categories include education and training factors, language
25
proficiency, work experience, age, and adaptability factors.
Using this straightforward rubric, a prospective immigrant can
easily evaluate his or her chances for admittance with a high degree
of certainty.2 6 Canada even offers a simple form on its immigration
website that the applicant accesses to answer a few short questions
about age, net worth, education, and if he or she has a Canadian job
offer. 27 The applicant receives a response regarding his or her
28
eligibility for a visa within twenty-four hours.
Canada's points system also emphasizes transparency by being
straightforward as to what characteristics it values in prospective
economic immigrants.2 9 The point categories and their relative values

points system in 1967, and has remained an "aggressive player" in attracting human
capital).
See, e.g., Nwokocha, supra note 2, at 54 (explaining that within the
19.
Canadian system, "[p]oints are assessed on six selection factors: education, ability in
English or French, experience, age, arranged employment, and adaptability").
20.
See id.
See Gafner & Yale-Loehr, supra note 4, at 188 ("Points are awarded based
21.
on criteria indicative of a foreign national's potential contribution to the country.").
See Ayelet Shachar, The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and
22.
Competitive Immigration Regimes, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 148, 172-73 (2006) (providing a
chart of the cumulative points categories).
23.
See id.
24.
See id.
25.
See id.
See Gafner & Yale-Loehr, supra note 4, at 187-88 ("The point system
26.
allows potential immigrants to easily compute whether they qualify for Canadian
immigrant status. Canada even offers a calculator to help potential immigrants
determine eligibility.").
See Come to Canada,CITIZENSHIP & IMMGR. CAN., http://www.cic.gc.calapp/
27.
ctcvac/english/qc100 (last updated Mar. 16, 2012).
See id.
28.
See Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 5, at 116 (quoting E-mail
29.
from Mark Davidson, Acting Dir., Econ. Policy & Programs Div., Citizenship and
Immigration Can., to Christoph Hoashi-Erhardt (Nov. 1, 2000, 4:11 PM) (on file with
Hoashi-Erhardt) (discussing objectives of Canada's system, one of which is
transparency).
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make it clear, for example, that Canada prefers younger immigrants
because its points system calls for a point deduction for applicants
over forty-five years of age.3 0
Despite these advantages, . Canada's point system is not
completely free from discretion and uncertainty. Canada amended its
immigration law in 2008 to state that "the visa may be issued" upon
meeting certain criteria, rather than "the visa shall be issued."3 ' This
change makes visa issuance more subjective, since an applicant that
obtains the requisite points and meets the other criteria for a visa
may nonetheless be passed over for an equally qualified applicant.
This change has been criticized as "'politicization' of the immigration
system."32
There are also special classifications of immigrants that have
much lower point thresholds for entry.3 3 Immigrants classified as
"entrepreneurs," for example, must obtain only twenty-five points to
be eligible for entry. 34 Classification in these special categories relies
on less objective criteria than the points rubric itself because it
depends on specific definitions that are open to interpretation. An
"entrepreneur" is one "who intends and has the ability to establish ...
business or commercial venture in Canada that will make a
significant contribution to the economy."3 5 The latter part of this
definition lends itself to far more discretion than the more objective
criteria, such as whether or not an applicant has an advanced degree.
Immigration officials, therefore, still possess a degree of discretion to
place an applicant in these special categories.
Canada's system has produced mixed results. While its points
system has been effective in increasing the overall number of skilled
immigrants entering Canada, not all of those skilled immigrants have
been able to contribute to Canada's labor market to their fullest
potential. 3 6 Because Canada admits many highly skilled immigrants

30.
See id. at 117 (explaining that two points are deducted for every additional
year of age over forty-four.).
31.
See George Jordan Ashkar, Note, Oh Canada! We Stand on Guardfor Thee:
Bill C-50 and the Negative Impact It "May" Have on Immigrant Hopes, Immigration
Objectivity, and the Immigration and Refugee Act of 2002, 17 Sw. J. INT'L LAW 143, 145
(2011) (discussing the 2008 amendment).
32.
Id. at 170 (quoting Vancouver immigration lawyer, Richard Kurland).
33.
See Applying for Permanent Residence-Business Class Applicants: Investors,
Entrepreneurs,Self-Employed Persons, CITIZENSHIP & IMMGR. CAN., http://www.cic.gc.cal
englishlinformation/applications/guides/4000ETOC.asp (last visited Nov. 05, 2012)
(discussing the three categories of business-class applicants).
34.
See id. Similarly, immigrants who are deemed "investors" need only obtain
twenty-five points. However, these classifications carry other requirements, such as an
agreement to invest a certain amount of money.
35.
See id. (emphasis added) (defining entrepreneur).
36.
See Lucy Trevelyan, Immigration: The U.K. Introduces Points-Based
Systems, 62 INT'L B. NEWS 13, 15 (2008) (discussing the difficulty of having educational
qualifications and work experiences recognized in Canada).
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without ensuring that they were likely or able to find a job, many of
these immigrants face unemployment or underemployment.3 7 Thus,
Canada's points system may not effectively enhance wealth or entice
skilled immigrants, because they may worry about underemployment
post-entry.3 8
One final, but not unsubstantial, criticism of Canada's point
system is that it implicitly disadvantages applicants from lower
socioeconomic backgrounds. 3 9 The system explicitly prefers skilled
workers and professionals, 40 who tend to be wealthier. 41 While
scholars often gloss over the disparate results based on an
immigrant's socioeconomic status, 42 they do exist. 43 Thus, while
outright class discrimination is not likely Canada's goal, the practical
burden on immigrants from lower socioeconomic backgrounds should
be noted, especially given that the majority of Canada's immigrants
enter through the points system. 44
Overall, however, Canada's points system benefits from its
simplicity and efficiency. 45 The points system has been considered a
success in attracting valuable human capital and has served as a

See id. ("In most cases, their educational qualifications and work
37.
experience are not recognised in Canada and immigrants holding PhD degrees can be
found driving taxis, working in factories or grocery stores." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
38.
See id. (discussing how skilled immigrants are frustrated by
underemployment and "the government's post-immigration indifference" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
39.
The points system disadvantages lower-skilled immigrants. Nwokocha,
supra note 2, at 55 (discussing the Canadian system's preference for skilled workers).
"Lower-skilled immigrants," however, is another way of saying poorer immigrants.
40.
See id.
41.
See Canada Prefers Rich Immigrants, CANADAUPDATES.COM (June 10, 2012),
http://www.canadaupdates.com/content/canada-prefers-rich-immigrants-18300.html
("Canadians prefer an immigrant with a heavy pocket than one with a degree from a
reputed University.").
Gafner and Yale-Loehr do not mention the possibility of economic
42.
immigration in their article at all. See generally Chris Gafner & Stephen Yale-Loehr,
Attracting the Best and the Brightest: A Critique of the Current U.S. Immigration
System, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 183 (2010). Nwokocha only briefly observes that
Canada's points system "limits" lower-skilled workers' immigration options. See
Nwokocha, supra note 2, at 55 ("It is a simplified system without annual quotas that
helps to provide the country with highly skilled workers, yet it limits the immigration
options of lower-skilled workers.").
43.
See Xuelin Zhang, The Wealth Position of Immigrant Families in Canada,
197 ANALYTICAL STUD. BRANCH RES. PAPER SERIES 1 (finding Canadian immigrants,
married and single, possess more wealth than their married and single Canadian-born
counterparts).
44.
See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
45.
See Nwokocha, supranote 2, at 55 (suggesting that Canada's points system
is a "simplified system" and is efficient, with applications for temporary work visas
being processed in as short as three weeks with preapproval).
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model for other countries' points systems.4 6 Its weaknesses include
certain definitional vagueness, the discretion still vested in visa
officers, the lack of tailoring to Canada's labor market, and the
disproportionately adverse effect on immigrants from lower
socioeconomic backgrounds.
B. Australia's General-Skills-MigrantsSystem
Australia followed Canada's lead two decades later, launching its
own revised immigration program in 1989.47 Economic migrants are
grouped into one of three main categories: General-Skills Migrants,
Employer-Sponsored Migrants, and Business-Skills Migrants. 48
General-Skills Migrants make up the majority of immigrants
entering Australia 49 and are assessed through a points system.5 0 The
other two categories are subject to separate requirements, so this
analysis will focus on the General-Skills-Migrants category.
To qualify under the General-Skills category, migrants must
meet certain bright-line criteria: they must be less than forty-five
years of age, speak "vocational English," and must elect an occupation
listed in the "Skilled Occupation List" (SOL). 5 1 Once they meet these
criteria, migrants must obtain at least 110 out of 150 possible points
to be eligible to immigrate to Australia. 52 The point categories are
similar to those in Canada and the United Kingdom, and award
points for younger age, occupational experience, and Englishlanguage ability.5 3 The most important attribute Australia looks for

46.
See Gafner & Yale-Loehr, supra note 4, at 188 (noting that Canada's
success in attracting needed human capital has led to highly skilled noncitizens
representing 7 percent of the Canadian workforce and other countries emulating its
system); see also Nwokocha, supra note 2, at 54 (noting that immigration under its
points system accounted for two-thirds of Canada's annual population growth in 2007).
47.
See Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Migration Fundamentals: Selecting
Economic Stream Immigrants Through Points Systems, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE (May
2007), http://www.migrationinformation.org/usfocus/display.cfm?ID=602 (outlining the
emergence and benefits of points systems).
48.
See Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 5, at 119 ("Australia's
migrant selection scheme groups economic-stream migrants into three broad
categories: General Skills Migrants, Employer Sponsored Migrants, and Business
Skills Migrants.").
See Nwokocha, supra note 2, at 56 ("The majority of immigrants entering
49.
Australia (133,500 or 70 percent) are skilled workers."); see also Yale-Loehr & HoashiErhardt, supra note 5, at 119 (noting that 68 percent of all planned economic migration
into Australia comes from the General-Skills category).
50.
See Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 5, at 119 ("General Skills
migrants are those who are selected using a points system . . . .").

51.
See id. at 121 (outlining the prerequisites for General-Skills applicants).
See id. at 122-23 (noting that out of a total of 150, "[i]ndependent migrants
52.
must score 110 points on the points test to be eligible to immigrate").
See id. at 121-23 (providing a clear chart of the points rubric for General53.
Skills migrants).
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is the level of skill the applicant's occupation requires; this accounts
for 55 percent of an applicant's potential score. s4 An applicant's
potential support system in Australia is also considered: migrants
who are sponsored either by an employer or a family member are
awarded an additional fifteen points. 55
One notable difference between Australia's point category and
other points systems is the lack of a separate point category for
education. 56 Education is instead subsumed into the "Skill"
category.5 7 This difference arose because Australia determined that it
is the specificity of education to occupation, rather than the quantity
of education, that best predicts an immigrant's success in the labor
market. 58 This approach, however, might reduce the amount of
immigrants who lack occupation-specific education, but who
nonetheless possess "generic, broad, and readily transferable skills." 59
While this might burden more generally skilled immigrants, it is a
good means to tailor the points system to Australia's need for
occupation-specific skilled immigrants.
Another difference between Australia's point systems and other
countries' point systems is that economic migrants receive additional
points for obtaining a degree from an Australian institute.6 0 Again,
this difference arises from the determination that Australian-trained
immigrants fair better in the Australian labor market than those who
receive their education abroad.i This idiosyncratic preference places
otherwise skilled immigrants that are trained abroad at a

See id. at 122 (noting that "[o]ccupations requiring an educational degree
54.
specific to the occupation" earn sixty points).
See id. at 123 ("The pass mark for SAS migrants is also 110 points, though
55.
they also receive 15 points for having a family sponsor and an assurer.").
See id. at 124 ("It is noteworthy that unlike Canada's point system,
56.
Australia does not have a separate assessment category for education.").
See id. ("Australia has opted to retain occupation-based, rather than
57.
education-based, points assessment. This emphasis reflects the research cited in
DIMA's review. The research concluded that it is the specificity of education, not the
quantity of education, that leads to labor-market success.").
58.

See id.

(citing DEP'T OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS,

REVIEW OF THE INDEPENDENT AND SKILLED-AUSTRALIAN LINKED CATEGORIES 4 (1999))
C'The study concludes that migrants trained in job-specific fields such as nursing,
computing and accountancy were more likely to obtain professional employment than
those with qualifications in more generalist fields such as 'society and culture,' natural
and physical sciences and economics.").
59.
See id. ("This conclusion seems reasonable, but nevertheless startling in a
climate in which having generic, broad, and readily transferable skills is often
considered most desirable.").
60.
See id. at 122 (noting that there is a separate "Australian Qualifications"
point category).
61.
See id. at 127 ("DIMA's review cites evidence that migrants who have been
trained in Australia are more successful in the labor market than those who obtain
their professional qualifications overseas.").
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disadvantage, but it is another means to tailor the points system to
the Australian labor market.
Overall, the Australian points system has been successful at
increasing the number of skilled workers entering the country. 62
Under its points system, a majority of immigrants entering Australia
are skilled workers. 63 However, despite this apparent success,
Australia faced a shortage of skilled laborers in the early 2000s. 64 To
address this, Australian officials revised the program in the late
2000s, shortening the SOL and imposing stricter regulation of
temporary visa programs. 65 This effectively made it more difficult for
immigrants to enter through the Skilled-Migrant category.6 6 And
although the measures decreased the number of skilled migrants in
total, they increased the likelihood that the immigrants that did enter
through the Skilled-Migrant category were likely to fulfill a specific
labor need. 67 Perhaps this reactionary measure ignored the
possibility of transferable skills-meaning that a migrant, while not
initially selecting an occupation from the SOL, might have sufficient
transferable skills to later enter one of the SOL occupations.
However, this possibility is not too concerning because the labor skills
shortages occur in areas of science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics (STEM), 68 making it unlikely that a highly educated
immigrant, with multiple advanced degrees in, say history, would
later fill such a shortage.
Though Australia's revisions to its points system may not be
completely successful at alleviating the skills shortage, perhaps there
would be an even greater skills shortage without the points system.

62.
NWOKOCHA, supra note 2, at 56 (noting that 70 percent of immigrants
entering Australia are skilled workers).
63.
See id.
64.
See id. ("Australia still faces a skills shortage. As of 2008, its booming
economy is in its seventeenth year of uninterrupted growth with unemployment at a
thirty year low . .. "); see also Australian Skilled Immigration Reforms and Western
Australia, OZVISA.COM (June 22, 2010), http://www.ozvisa.com/news/2010-06-22/
australialskilled-immigration-reforms-western-australia.htm [hereinafter Australian
Reforms] (discussing shortages in the local labor market).
65.
See Australian Reforms, supra note 64 ("Recent changes to the Australian
immigration system include the following: A new shorter skilled occupation list;
Tougher regulations covering the temporary worker 457 visa; New State and territory
migration plans.").
66.
See id. ("Overall, it has become more difficult to come under the Australian
skilled migration scheme.").
67.
See id. (noting that the reforms are intended to create a "demand-driven
migration system which targets the skills [Australia] need[s] to meet the shortages in
the local labour market").
68.
RUSSEL TYTLER ET AL., OPENING UP PATHWAYS: ENGAGEMENT IN STEM
ACROSS THE PRIMARY-SECONDARY SCHOOL TRANSITION, at vii (2008) ("Australia has a
serious STEM skills shortage.").
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Overall, Australia's points system is regarded as efficient and
sufficiently flexible to address Australia's labor needs. 69

C. The United Kingdom's Points-BasedSystem
In 2008, the United Kingdom adopted the Points-Based System
70
(PBS) in an overhaul of its employment-based immigration system,
7
structuring the PBS with five tiers. Lawmakers touted the PBS as
the means to attract highly skilled and talented workers "to
contribute to growth and productivity" through its Tier I General
category.7 2 The PBS also provides for admission of skilled workers
with job offers to "fill gaps" in the UK labor force through its Tier II
category.73 The last tiers provide for (III) admission of low-skilled
workers in order to fill temporary labor shortages, (IV) students, and
(V) youth and temporary workers who enter the United Kingdom on a
74
temporary basis primarily to fulfill noneconomic objectives.
Like Canada's points system, the PBS awards points to
prospective immigrants for characteristics it views as indicative of
high potential value to the United Kingdom's labor market. Many of
the PBS's point categories for the first two tiers are similar to
Canadian categories-job qualifications, age, earnings, etc. 7
Applicants must obtain seventy-five points or more to qualify for a
work permit under Tier 1.76
While the PBS is similar to Canada's points system, it does vary
in a few important aspects. Unlike Canada, the PBS places a cap on
the number of immigrants that can enter through Tier I.7 The cap
worries those concerned with human-capital accumulation because it

See NWOKOCHA, supra note 2, at 59 (noting that Australia's points system
69.
has rapid visa processing and flexibility to address Australia's economic needs).
See Gafner & Yale-Loehr, supra note 4, at 189 (describing the United
70.
Kingdom's immigration points system).
71.
See id.
See Alan C. Neal, Migrant Workers and the United Kingdom Labor Market:
72.
Some Trends and Implications of Twenty-First Century InternationalLabor Migration
Flows, 31 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 91, 100 (2009) (describing tier qualifications).
See id. (defining Tier II as "[s]killed workers with a job offer, to fill gaps in
73.
United Kingdom labor force").
See id. (defining Tiers III, IV, and IV as: "Tier 3: Limited numbers of low
74.
skilled workers needed to fill temporary labor shortages"; "Tier 4: Students"; and "Tier
5: Youth mpbility and temporary workers, who are allowed to work in the United
Kingdom for a limited period of time to satisfy primarily non-economic objectives").
See generally Laura Devine, Not So Good Migrations:The New UK Points
75.
Based System Has Poor Vibrations for Immigration,2010 EMERGING ISSUES 4825, 4825
(2010) (describing Tier I and II point criteria under the United Kingdom's PBS).
76.
See id. (noting Tier I requirements).
See Gafner & Yale-Loehr, supra note 4, at 190. This cap was put in place
77.
from July 19, 2010, until March 31, 2011. Id.
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could lead to a backlog of desirable immigrants.7 8 But perhaps this
cap is necessitated by the fact that the United Kingdom is subject to
the "free movement" obligations as a member of the European Union
and must establish the right of free movement for workers within the
European Union. 79 At any rate, the United Kingdom has unique
obligations affecting its immigration policies with respect to other EU
member nations, which may explain the cap.
Another notable deviation from the Canadian model, at least
until recently, 80 was a civil-penalty component for employers. 81
Employers caught employing illegal migrant workers can face a civil
penalty of up to £10,000 for each illegal worker.82 Thus, the United
Kingdom seeks to admit only immigrants it deems to be beneficial to
the country on the front-end, and imposes civil penalties as an
enforcement measure on the back-end. While this could help deter
illegal immigration, it increases the overall costs of implementing
immigration policy because it places compliance burdens on
employers and law enforcement officials.8 3
While objectivity and transparency are the primary objectives
behind the PBS, 84 critics also point out that the use of strict
categories and points removes the discretion necessary to
differentiate applicants who will truly benefit the United Kingdom.85
However, the excessive discretion and subjectivity that characterized
the former system was precisely what Parliament was aiming to

78.
See id. ("Whether the recent cap will create a backlog is yet to be seen.
Further, if a backlog is created, it is unknown how (or if) the United Kingdom will
differentiate between highly skilled workers and the truly best and brightest.").
79.
See Martin Kahanec & Klaus F. Zimmermann, Migration in an Enlarged
EU: A Challenging Solution?, 363 EcoN. PAPERS 1, 2-3 (2009) (referring to the free
movement of workers as a core principle of the European Union); Neal, supra note 72,
at 103 (explaining the "common labour market" obligations of the European Union).
80.
See New Changes Affecting the Temporary Foreign Worker and Live-In
Caregiver Programs, IMMIGRATION.CA,
http://www.immigration.ca/tempent-workfworker.asp (last visited Dec. 21, 2012) (noting new reforms taking effect April 1, 2011,
which impose employer penalties).
81.
See Neal, supra note 72, at 112-13 (discussing employer sanctions).
See UKBA Report Names Employers Penalized for Violations of
82.
Employment
Authorization
Rules,
FRAGOMEN
(Feb.
14,
2012),
http://www.fragomen.com/united-kingdom-02-14-2012/ (discussing £10,000 employer
civil penalties).
83.
See Neal, supranote 72, at 102, 112 (noting the added burden of compliance
on employers).
84.
See id. ("Points are awarded based on . . . 'objective and transparent
criteria.. . .').
85.
See Devine, supra note 75, ("The simplicity and objectivity ... whil[e]
laudable in principle, have resulted in turning a refined immigration system into a
rather crude, blunt instrument which neither allows entry for those who will most
benefit the UK, nor restricts entry of these [sic] who will not.").
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reduce by implementing the PBS.§6 While a bright-line approach may
create inequities in some cases, many have applauded the PBS's
objectivity and predictability goals,87 though some question whether
the PBS actually achieves those goals.8 8

D. The United States'Employment-Based System
In contrast is the U.S. employment-based system. Though the
United States classifies economic immigrants into one of five
categories by desirability, the classification is not accomplished with
a points system.89 The central goal of the system is also different.
Rather than focusing on long-term human-capital accumulation, the
United States largely uses its economic immigration system to meet
the immediate needs of its labor riarket without permanent
residency.9 0 As such, the United States makes permanent residency a
difficult and uncertain task.
The United States first implemented its modern economic
immigration system with the Immigration Act of 1990, creating a
system of five categories (colloquially referred to as EBI through
EB5). 9 1The following table outlines these categories and what kind of
immigrant it includes.92
Employment-Based Category
EBI
EB2
EB3
EB4
EB5

Includes ...
Priority Workers
Immigrants with Advanced Degrees
Skilled Workers & Other Works
Special Immigrants
Employment Creation

See id. (noting that when enacted, the British government lauded the PBS
86.
as a simple, transparent, and objective system).
87.
See id. (noting that when enacted, the national press and UK government
lauded the PBS for its objectivity and simplicity); Gafner & Yale-Loehr, supra note 4,
at 187 (describing the United Kingdom's PBS as "objective and systematic").
See Devine, supra note 75 (discussing how the PBS sometimes restricts
88.
entry of those would benefit the United Kingdom, and allows entry of those who would
not benefit the United Kingdom).
89.
See Nwokocha, supra note 2, at 42-43 (discussing the five preference
categories for economic immigrants created by the Immigration Act of 1990); YaleLoehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 5, at 129 (indicating that the United States has
not adopted a points system).
90.
See Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 5, at 101 (noting the
immigration system's sole goal of meeting immediate labor needs rather than longterm realities).
91.
See Nwokocha, supra note 2, at 42-43 (discussing the method and effects of
the Immigration Act of 1990); see also Gafner & Yale-Loehr, supra note 4, at 185
(stating the colloquial terminology).
92.
See Nwokocha, supra note 2, at 43 (illustrating the categories with a more
detailed table).
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The EBI category is further broken down into two
subcategories-one for applicants with "extraordinary" ability in
business, the arts and sciences, athletics, or education (EB-1-1), and
the other for "outstanding" applicants in education and research (EB1-2).93 Congress caps the number of individuals able to enter through
each of these categories. 94 Presumably, the EB1 and EB2 categories
are for the most desirable immigrants, as these categories have the
highest annual minimum visas available.9 5
Though this scheme looks similar to a points system, it is unlike
a points system because the United States provides no objective
framework for determining which immigrants should be classified in
the preferred categories of immigrants.9 6 The statute only provides
that an individual possesses "extraordinary" ability when his or her
ability has been "demonstrated by sustained national or international
acclaim and whose achievements have been recognized in the field
through extensive documentation." 9 Because the statute and
applicable rules do not further define ambiguous terms, like
"sustained," "acclaim," or "achievements," the statute presumably
leaves this determination to the discretion of the immigration official
reviewing the application. This case-by-case determination by
immigration officials is much different than the more objective use of
a detailed points rubric to guide immigration officials in making such
determinations.
Relying on vague definitions to sort through prospective
immigrants makes it difficult for the United States to identify those
immigrants that would be most beneficial to its labor market.9 8 This
imposes uncertainty and loss of efficiency, both for the United States
in implementing its immigration policy and for the prospective
immigrant. There is a high degree of uncertainty for the prospective
immigrant because vague definitions and categories make it difficult
for him or her to determine with any confidence whether he or she
will qualify for a visa under a particular category.
Lastly, despite the United States' focus on current labor market
needs, there is a long-standing and increasing skills shortage in

Gafner & Yale-Loehr, supra note 4, at 185.
93.
94.
Id. at 193 (noting the current cap for all economic immigration is set at
140,000).
See Nwokocha, supra note 2, at 43 (showing that the EB1 and EB2
95.
categories each have an annual minimum of 40,040, while the remaining categories
have successively lower minimums).
96.
See Gafner & Yale-Loehr, supra note 4, at 194-95 (asking the tough
question of what exactly constitutes "extraordinary" or "outstanding" ability).

97.

8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(A) (2006).

98.
Indeed, the Immigration and Naturalization Service admitted in its
proposed revisions to IMMACT90 in 1995 that "confusion [had arisen] over the role of
various types of evidence [for categorization]." Gafner & Yale-Loehr, supra note 4, at
199.
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STEM areas.9 9 The annual caps on the EB1 and EB2 categories have
created a backlog of skilled immigrants waiting to be admitted and
have done nothing to help alleviate this shortage. 100 Thus, the
employment-based system does not accumulate human capital,
because that is not its intended goal, and it does not accomplish its
stated goal of filling short-term labor market needs.

III. DISSECTING THE DOWNSIDES OF POINTS SYSTEMS
Despite the potential benefits of points systems, not every
country that has considered adopting a points system has done so.' 0 '
The United States is a prominent example.102 Points systems present
their own set of challenges and shortcomings, which this Part
addresses.
These potential challenges include both human rights and
economic concerns, 0 3 which will likely be raised in the policy debates
surrounding the implementation of a points system in the United
States.1 04 This Part identifies some of the worries critics may have
with points systems. These issues, however, should inform the design
of a U.S. points system, rather than defeat one altogether.
A. Human Rights Concerns
Sovereign nations enjoy broad authority when determining
immigration policy. 0 5 Modern immigration policymakers, however,

99.
See Andrew J. Rotherham, The Next Great Resource Shortage: U.S.
(May
26,
2011),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/
Scientists, TIME
0,8599,2074024,00.html (discussing the underproduction of STEM graduates in the
United States); see also Danielle Kurtzleben, STEM Shortage a Symptom of Broader
National, Cultural Problems, U.S.NEWS (June 28, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/
news/blogs/stem-education/20 12/06/28/stem-shortage-a- symptom-of-broader-nationalcultural-problems (noting that there has been a shortage of STEM workers in the
United States for the past fifty years).
100.
See Rotherham, supra note 99 (stating that U.S. companies advocate for
expanding workers allowed under the "H-1B" visa program because of the difficulty of
finding qualified American workers).
101.
See Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 5, at 129 ("The U.S. Congress
has considered but rejected a point system.").
102.
Id.
103.
See generally Tomer Broude, The Most-Favoured Nation Principle, Equal
Protection,and Migration Policy, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 553 (2010) (addressing human
rights and economic concerns in a different immigration-policy context).
104.
See Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 5, at 130 (noting a
discrimination concern that was raised when the United States previously attempted
to implement a points system).
105.
See supra text accompanying note 1.
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should seek to comport with basic human rights ideals. 106 This
subpart examines the human rights goals of freedom of movement
and nondiscrimination. 10 7
The freedom of movement is a modern human rights goal.108
Some liberal-leaning scholars suggest easing immigration restrictions
to achieve this goal.1 09 Points systems, however, eschew freedom of
movement, as their very design is intended to restrict economic
immigration to those immigrants that policymakers have deemed to
have high human-capital potential. 110
This should not be concerning, however, because the express
language in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights defines the
right narrowly; it is a right to move freely within a nation, not a right
to move freely among nations. 1 ' The right to leave a sovereign nation
is considered a part of the right of freedom of movement, but there is
no corresponding right to enter a sovereign nation. 1 2 Concededly, the
two are logically tied because restricting a person from entering a
country naturally limits his or her ability to exercise the right to
leave," 3 but the right of freedom of movement should not necessitate
abandoning restrictive immigration policies because of the important
sovereignty and self-determination aspects of immigration policy.1 14
A more poignant human rights concern for points systems is
discrimination.115 The most obvious potential for discrimination is

106.
See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation,100 YALE L.J. 545, 566
(1990) (quoting T. Alexander Alienikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the
Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 9, 19 (1990)) (discussing an emerging model of
immigration law that is "based on [the] 'notion of fundamental human rights that
protects individuals regardless of their status"').
107.
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 13,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (declaring the right to
"freedom of movement"); Broude, supra note 103, at 553 (mentioning the
nondiscrimination goal of immigration policy). ,
108.
See UDHR, supra note 107 (creating a right to freedom of movement within
a country and the right to leave and return to one's country).
109.

See

generally MIGRATION

WITHOUT BORDERS:

ESSAYS

ON THE

FREE

MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE (Antoine P~coud & Paul de Guchteneire eds., 2007) (advocating
for open borders by exploring international perspectives on, and successful approaches
to, migration and free movement).
110.
See Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 5, at 102 (noting that the
points system is designed to evaluate "[a] person's potential for economic
contribution").
111.
See UDHR, supra note 107 (discussing "the right to freedom of movement
and residence within the borders of each State").
112.
See id. (stating no corresponding right of entry into a foreign country).
113.
See Purcell, supra note 1, at 178 (noting the conundrum created by
expressing a right to leave a country without any corresponding right to enter another).
114.
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
See Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 5, at 130 (referring to
115.
complaints of discrimination by immigrants' rights groups).
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socioeconomic discrimination. 1 6 The goal of a points system is to
identify and select immigrants with the most "human capital"; 117 this
logically favors immigrants with greater wealth that are more likely
to have higher education and other skills.118 The PBS, for example,
explicitly requires applicants to possess a specified amount of money
as evidence of maintenance ability.1 19 While socioeconomic status is
not an immutable attribute, it is one that may be far more difficult to
change than other mutable traits, like language ability, which can be
learned. Indeed, it is often economic aspirations that compel people to
immigrate in the first place. 120
This concern, however, is reduced if a points system is only a
single component of an overall immigration scheme. 2 1 If there are
other immigration systems that address different goals, like family
for socioeconomic
the concern
asylum,
and
reunification
discrimination is reduced. 122 So long as there are noneconomic
options for legal immigration, the fact that a points system's goal may
necessitate disparate results depending on an immigrant's
socioeconomic background is less concerning because there are other
options for entry.
Of course, points systems are increasingly accounting for the
majority of immigrants entering countries like Australia and
Canada. 123 This might very well mean that while there are
alternatives in theory, there are few real options for legal entry for
immigrants from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. Policymakers
considering adopting a points system should bear this challenge in
mind and retain other means of legal entry as a viable alternative for
immigrants from nonwealthy backgrounds.

116.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text (pointing out that Canada's
system "limits" lower-income immigrants).
117.
See Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 5, at 102 (discussing the
"human capital" test that evaluates the "work experience, education, and language
ability" of applicants).
118.
See generally Canada Prefers Rich Immigrants, supra note 41 (noting
Canada's preference for more educated and wealthier immigrants).
119.
See Devine, supra note 75. The United Kingdom requires applicants for
Tier-I to have "a minimum of £2,800 in addition to £1,600 for each accompanying
dependant." Id. While these maintenance figures are not outrageously high, it is a
much heavier burden for applicants from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. See id. ("Is
the point simply that UKBA aims to keep less affluent migrants out and leave an open
door to wealthier migrants?").
120.
See Nwokocha, supra note 2, at 61 ("[flor all migrants, the vast majority
move for economic incentives."); see also Kahanec & Zimmermann, supra note 79, at
12-13 (noting that an array of employment-related factors are key reasons why people
choose to immigrate).
121.
See Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 5, at 132 (noting that
economic considerations cannot be the only factors considered when designing
immigration systems).
122.
See id. ("Economic enhancement is just one of many worthy goals.").
123.
See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
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is
racial
or
ethnic
discrimination
concern
Another
discrimination. For example, when the United States contemplated
enacting a points system, Hispanic activists criticized the language
component as racist. 124 Under this line of reasoning, language is so
inextricably tied to racial or ethnic identity that language
requirements or language preferences equate to discrimination
towards those racial or ethnic groups that have a different primary
language.
Again, this concern should inform a proposed points system, not
defeat it. Language components exist because immigrants with
certain language proficiencies are more likely to succeed in the labor
market than those who do not have the same proficiency.125 There is
no apparent and affirmative intent to discriminate against particular
racial or ethnic groups.126 Preferring a mutable characteristic that is
rationally tied to economic success is far less concerning than active
discrimination against immutable characteristics that are not related
to economic success.
Policymakers should include a language component only where
there is evidence that language is tied to immigrants' economic
success. When language components are justifiable, policymakers can
also set language point values so that they are not so high as to be
virtually determinative of entry. In this way, considering human
rights can improve a points system.
B. Economic Concerns
According to the scholar Tomer Broude, "most of international
migration is economic in nature." 127 Economic theory, then, is
another important way to inform immigration policy. An economic
prospective concerns itself primarily with utilitarian and welfare-

124.
See Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 5, at 130 ("Hispanic and
other immigrants' rights groups argued that including an English language component
was racist and discriminatory.").
See id. at 116 (citing CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION CAN., SKILLED WORKER
125.
IMMIGRANTS: TOWARDS A NEW MODEL OF SELECTION 20 (1998)) ("[T]here is a very close
correlation between language ability and economic success.").
Admittedly, language components are potential tools that racist
126.
policymakers could use to implement racial or ethnic discrimination. This possibility,
however, is mitigated when policymakers have empirical evidence justifying the
language component. See CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION CAN., SKILLED WORKER
IMMIGRANTS: TOWARDS A NEW MODEL OF SELECTION 20 (1998) 20-21 (discussing
empirical data that reflects benefits of language proficiency to both immigrant and
country).
127.
Broude, supra note 103, at 553-54.
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maximizing goals. 128 This subpart addresses whether or not economic
points systems are welfare-maximizing.
One possible way to approach immigration policy through an
economic lens is to apply economic principles to immigration policy.1 29
Applying free-market principles to immigration policy should be
"welfare-enhancing."1 3 0 Take, for example, the Most-Favored-Nation
(MFN) principle. 131 The MFN principle holds that an importing
country should not discriminate among imports based on country of
origin. 132 By treating all goods equally, a receiving country eliminates
market inefficiencies created by preferential treatment.1 3 3
Analogized and applied broadly to immigration policy, freemarket principles would, in theory, proscribe points systems'
preferential treatment of certain economic immigrants. The goal is
the liberalization of the movement of goods and people, which
"ensur[es] the proper functioning of market forces." 134 If this is true,
the opposite-restriction on the movement of human capital-should
have the converse effect.
This rough approximation of economic principles to immigration
policy, however, is hardly accepted truth. Henry Simons, a founder of
the "Chicago School" of free economics and proponent of free-market
ideas, specifically stated that these principles do not apply to
immigration policy: "Wholly free immigration, however, is neither
attainable nor desirable. To insist that a free trade program is
logically or practically incomplete without free migration is either
disingenuous or stupid. Free trade may and should raise living
standards everywhere . . .. Free immigration would level standards,

perhaps, without raising them anywhere." 135 While Simons's
assessment reflects some assumptions about immigration, such as the
effect of immigration "level[ing] standards," which may not comport

See id. at 556 ("From an economic perspective, the evaluation of [Most128.
Favored Nation] in migration policy is guided by utilitarian considerations.").
See id. at 556-59 for a discussion of the MFN principle as applied to
129.
immigration policy.
See id. at 556 (noting that the MFN principle may promote liberal
130.
movement, and thereby enhance welfare, when applied to migration).
See id. (describing the goals of the principle in international trade law).
131.
See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 59th Sess., May 7-June 8, July 9-Aug.
132.
10, 2007, 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.719 (July 20, 2007) (explaining that an MFN clause
is one through which a state consents to providing a contracting partner state
"treatment that is no less favourable" than the treatment of other states).
See Broude, supra note 103, at 557 ("MFN at entry would seem to be the
133.
most efficient general rule.").
134.
Id. at 556.
Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., The State of U.S. Immigration Policy: The Quandary
135.
of Economic Methodology and the Relevance of Economic Research To Know, 5 J.L.
ECON. & POL'Y 177, 180 (2009) (quoting HENRY C. SIMONs, ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A
FREE SOCIETY 251 (1948)).
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with empirical findings,13 6 it does indicate that even the fathers of
free-market principles never intended them to apply to immigration
7
policy.' 3
Simplistic application of free-market principles to immigration
policy raises other concerns. First, immigrants themselves, unlike
goods, endure costs of moving among nations, such as the expense of
moving and assimilating into a new land. 138 Second, there is a
distinction between "at the border" treatment and "behind the border"
treatment.13 9 The MFN principle, for example, only looks at "at the
border" policies.140 Even if immigrants are afforded equal treatment
"at the border," this does not necessitate equal treatment "behind the
border." 141 Yet the treatment of immigrants after entry necessarily
affects a prospective immigrant's choice whether to relocate just as
much as "at the border" considerations. 142 It is likely that a
prospective immigrant would find it relevant if, for example,
immigrants were treated equally at the border, but then subjected to
systematic discrimination once they arrived. Thus, simply applying
economic principles to immigration policy is crude at best. 14 3
Even if these free-market principles can be applied to
immigration policy, careful parsing of the principles themselves
might reveal that they do not necessitate the rejection of restrictive
policies like points systems. The MFN principle dictates equal
treatment of imports no matter the origin to ensure that less efficient
exporters are not arbitrarily favored over more efficient ones. 144

136.
See Kahanec & Zimmermann, supra note 79, for labor studies in the effects
of immigration within the European Union, finding little support for common
assumptions of the negative impacts of immigration, such as welfare shopping, job
depletion, and wage reduction. See also Don J. DeVoretz & Samuel A. Laryea,
CanadianImmigration Experience: Any Lessons for Europe?, in EUROPEAN MIGRATION:
WHAT Do WE KNow? 573 (K.F. Zimmermann ed., 2005), for studies in Canadian labor
markets that suggest there is no detrimental displacement of Canadian workers by
immigrants.
137.
See Briggs, supra note 135, at 180 ("[T]he reciprocal of free trade policies is
not free labor mobility.").
138.
See Broude, supra note 103, at 557 (asserting that the immigrants who
should migrate are "those for whom the opportunity cost of migration is lowest").
139.
See id. at 557-58 (discussing treatment of migrants at entry and after
entry).
140.
See id. at 554-55 (describing the MFN-inspired General Agreement on
Labor Migration, which advocates for equal "at the border" treatment of immigrants).
See id. at 557 ("MFN at entry would not be sufficient ... if it were not
141.
supported by MFN 'behind the border."').
142.
See id. (explaining the potential for disparate treatment "behind the
border" that may undercut the effects of MFN at entry).
See id. at 559 ("[T]he transfer of the economic and political rationales of
143.
MFN from trade in goods to migration is not a smooth one.").
144.
See id. at 556 (describing the economic purpose of MFN to avoid trade
diversion where differential treatment of goods leads to discrimination against goods
from the most efficient exporters).
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Thus, if narrowly applied to immigration policy, the MFN principle
implies that a policy that discriminates based on the country of origin
of an immigrant is inefficient. This does not mean, however, that the
system that discriminates along some other metric is necessarily
inefficient. Origin-based preferences may be largely arbitrary, but the
economic preferences of points systems are based on empirical
evidence and rational assumptions; the two are not analogous.
In fact, points systems can be used to remedy the potential
market failures that completely unrestricted immigration could
create.145 Where a country's own citizens prove inadequate to fill a
labor shortage, as is the case in the United States for workers with
and other technical backgrounds, 146 economic
engineering
can address these kinds of labor shortfalls.147
policies
immigration
Thus, while free-market principles may be helpful for goods and
services to eliminate market inefficiencies, restrictive and carefully
tailored immigration policies may be needed to eliminate those same
labor market inefficiencies. Points systems do just that.

C. Points Systems Results
Points systems should be judged ultimately by the results they
produce. Points systems, when properly designed and implemented,
can identify and admit highly skilled immigrants. 148 The bigger
question is whether doing so benefits the receiving country. While the
intuitive answer is yes, the results are mixed, indicating that a points
system itself is not the magic bullet to a successful economic
immigration regime. Both the points structure of a points system and
corresponding immigration policy should be used to maximize the
utilitarian benefit of admitting highly skilled immigrants.

See Gafner & Yale-Loehr, supra note 4, at 208 (discussing how the goals of
145.
the United States' employment-based immigration system "must ensure the inclusion
of immigrant workers who are capable of contributing to the U.S. national interest");
see also James J. Orlow, America's Incoherent Immigration Policy: Some Problems and
Solutions, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 931, 932 (advocating a restriction on the flow of
immigration to prevent a large influx of immigrants that would threaten the domestic
job market).
See Nwokocha, supra note 2, at 46 (noting that in 2004, there was a
146.
continued demand for workers in the technology and high-skill-industries sector and an
"obvious shortage").
See id. at 65 (asserting the employment-based immigrants can help fill
147.
specific labor shortages).
148.
See infra Part IV.A (proposing that the United States would benefit from
ensuring the success of its immigrants in the U.S. labor force).
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Highly Skilled Immigrants Can Benefit the Receiving Country
First, highly skilled immigrants make a valuable, if somewhat

intangible contribution to a nation's intellectual pool of resources.149
More importantly, though, is the economic contribution of highly
skilled immigrants. As George Borjas, an economist at Harvard
University explained, "Skilled immigrants earn more, pay higher
taxes, and require fewer social services than less-skilled
immigrants."1 50 .Thus, immigrants that enter through the highest
categories of points systems-those most skilled and human-capital
rich-not only increase economic output and contribute to the tax
base, they also start businesses, thereby generating jobs and
increasing wealth for the receiving country.15
Many of the worries a receiving country has regarding
immigration in general often are economic concerns. 152 Countries
may worry that immigrants will harm labor markets by increasing
unemployment, depressing wages, or becoming burdens of social
welfare programs. 153 However, these concerns are largely
inapplicable when immigrants are employed and economically
successful.
There are also protectionist concerns that immigrants take jobs
from domestic workers.1 54 Again, these concerns can be managed
through the structure of a points system, which would ideally admit a
large portion of immigrants that will fill labor shortages left by the
domestic labor workforce.s5 5 In short, many of the common concerns

See Nwokocha, supra note 2, at 63-64 (noting employment-based
149.
immigrants pay taxes and add to the intellectual wealth of the receiving country).
150.
Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 5, at 101 (quoting GEORGE J.
BORJAS, HEAVEN's DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 190-91

(1999)).
151.
See Saxenian, supra note 15 (asserting that the most successful immigrant
entrepreneurs are those whose start-ups draw on ethnic networks for support while
integrating into mainstream technology and business networks, thereby creating links
between high-tech communities around the world).
152.
See Kahanec & Zimmermann, supra note 79, at 2 (noting the
"apprehension" within the European Union regarding migration); see also Neal, supra
note 72, at 105 (reporting that after the 2004 enlargement of the European Union,
many original member states engaged in restrictive transitional arrangements to
guard against inundation of domestic labor markets by workers from new member
states).
153.
See Nwokocha, supra note 2, at 64 (discussing unemployment and wage
suppression concerns); see also Kahanec & Zimmermann, supra note 79, at 8
(mentioning the "welfare tourism" concern).
154.
See Neal, supra note 72, at 124 (discussing the British Prime Minister's call
for "British jobs for British workers").
155.
See Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 5, at 101 ("[S]killed
immigrants earn more, pay higher taxes, and require fewer social services than lessskilled immigrants." (quoting GEORGE BORJAS, HEAVEN'S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY
AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 190-191 (1999))).
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regarding immigration in general are simply inapplicable to points
systems, which bring in human-capital-rich immigrants who are
likely to succeed in the domestic labor market.
2.

Caveats: When Point Systems Do Not Produce Advantages

First, point systems, despite the greater procedural simplicity
and clarity, can still produce long delays between the time an
immigrant applies for a visa and the time his or her application is
approved,15 6 as is the case with Canada's points system.1 57 The long
delay is attributed to Canada's lack of an occupations list like
Australia's SOL, which forces employers to prove that the immigrant
will fill a position that the employer cannot fill with domestic
workers. 5 8 This results in duplication and delay.1 59
Further, Canada's long waiting period often means that the
incoming supply of skilled immigrants lags behind the labor
demands.160 Labor demand can change significantly over the course
of six to seven years.161 Even if an immigrant applies for a visa in
2012, with the intent to enter an occupational field that is
experiencing a labor shortage, when that immigrant's application is
approved in 2018, the labor demand could be vastly different; there
could even be a labor surplus. The immigrant would then experience
difficulty finding a job in his or her field of choice. 162 This not only
produces potential difficulty for the immigrant post-entry, it also
means that the immigrant is not producing to his or her fullest
potential, to the detriment of the receiving country. Long delays,
therefore, result in less effectiveness.
Another way that a points system can fail even when it
successfully identifies and admits highly skilled immigrants is by
failing to ensure the success of those immigrants post-entry. 163

156.
See Trevelyan, supra note 36, at 15 (noting the wait time in Canada can be
up to six or seven years).
See id.
157.
158.
See id. (explaining further that the Canadian government provides no
guidelines to show employers what criteria they must fulfill when they seek to hire
foreign workers).
159.
See id. ("This is a cumbersome process that results in duplication and
delay.").
160.
See id. (listing drawbacks of Canada's lengthy immigration process,
including shifts in available jobs within the labor market).
161.
See id. ("The negative effect of this delay is that the new immigrants
coming to Canada, who had applied six or seven years before under the skilled worker
class, do not meet the local labour market demand." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
See id. (discussing the problems that arise when highly skilled immigrants
162.
cannot find employment in their fields of choice).
See id. (concerning the lack of assistance programs for new immigrants in
163.
Canada).
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Canada, for example, admitted 2.5 million skilled immigrants
through its points system from 1993 to 2006.164 However, in many
cases, the immigrant's educational qualifications and work experience
were not recognized in Canada, resulting in immigrants with Ph.D.
degrees working as taxi drivers and in other low-skill occupations.1 65
Underemployment post-entry is a concern not only for the
prospective immigrant, but also for the receiving country. The
wealth-producing benefits of skilled immigrants are only realized if
those immigrants are employed and using their talents to their fullest
potential.166 This is why a U.S. points system should not be solely
focused on acquiring human capital; it should also ensure that the
immigrants admitted through the points system could be successful
in the job market post-entry so that their talent is not wasted.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR AU.S. POINTS SYSTEM
A points system offers many benefits, as discussed above, but it
must be properly designed and implemented to achieve those
benefits.167 This Note suggests that the goal of a U.S. points system
should be not only to accumulate highly skilled immigrants, but also
to ensure those immigrants' talents are not wasted. This can be
accomplished by designing points categories with education and
occupational need in mind. This Note also suggests that there are two
important corollaries to a successful points system: (1) an
immigration assistance program that will help immigrants assimilate
post-entry and (2) other noneconomic immigration systems that offer
viable means for legal entry outside of the points system.
A. Tweaking Points: DesigningPoints Categories with
Labor Demand in Mind
In addition to accumulating human capital, a points system
should meet the actual needs of the U.S. labor force. Building humancapital accumulation is certainly a laudable goal, but ensuring that
immigrants are successful in the labor force is important not only for

164.

Id.

See id. (reporting foreign workers' frustration over "the government's post165.
immigration indifference").
Economic immigration is wealth enhancing because economic immigrants
166.
contribute to the tax base, while requiring fewer social services on average, and
creating jobs by starting new businesses. See generally Saxenian, supra note 15
(describing entrepreneurship among immigrants). This is only true, however, if the
economic immigrant can find employment post-entry.
167.
Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 5, at 102 (noting that a points
system can benefit a country if properly designed).
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the individual immigrants themselves, but also for the United
States.10 8 A country can accumulate as many scientists, engineers, or
doctors as it wants, but if there are no jobs for those immigrants after
entry, the accumulation is neither beneficial for the immigrants or
the United States. Therefore, a U.S. points system must ensure that
it is identifying immigrants that are likely to succeed post-entry.
One way to identify immigrants who are likely to succeed is to
determine what the country's labor needs are and award more points
for economic immigrants that will fill those needs. Australia
accomplishes this with its SOL prerequisite for skilled immigrationonly immigrants entering certain listed occupations can gain entry
through that system.16 9 The SOL is flexible; it can be adjusted based
on labor market changes, which Australia has done.170
The United States can create its own version of a SOL, but
unlike Australia's SOL, the U.S. version should be a list of preferred
occupations, used to award more points for those immigrants entering
occupations where there is a need for workers, rather than a
prerequisite for entry. Some of these occupations might include
scientific researchers, engineers, and other occupations with labor
needs that are not currently being met by domestic workers. 71 The
list of preferred occupations would allow the points system to give
greater preference to immigrants that will fill a real need in the labor
force, but would not foreclose the entry of highly skilled immigrants
that could contribute human capital outside of temporary labor
shortages, like a prerequisite would do.1 72
While this is ultimately a utilitarian idea-maximizing
immigrants' human capital for the benefit of the country-it also
aligns with the individual immigrants' welfare. If a point system
blindly admits any and all immigrants that are educated, have
capital, and are proficient in the language, without regard to what
the labor market needs or can absorb, then a country runs the risk of
frustrating those talented immigrants post-entry when they
experience unemployment or underemployment.173
Another way the United States can better ensure immigrants'
success with its points system is by awarding more points to

168.
See discussion supra Part III.C.2.
169.
See Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 5, at 121 (describing the
SOL, associated point values, and experience requirements).
170.
See generally Australian Reforms, supra note 64 (explaining changes to
Australia's skilled migration system, including a shortened SOL).
171.
See Kurtzleben, supranote 99 ("At the U.S. News Stem Summit 2012, [Rick
Stephens, senior vice president of human resources and administration at Boeing]
described a 50-year decline in U.S. STEM performance. . . .").
See Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 5, at 101-02 (criticizing the
172.
restraint of human-capital accumulation).
173.
See Trevelyan, supra note 36, at 15 (describing the frustration of highly
qualified foreign workers whose skills are underutilized).
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prospective immigrants with an existing job offer, regardless of
whether it is in a preferred occupation. This would be beneficial for
two reasons. First, the existence of a job offer indicates a labor need.
Though it doesn't necessarily mean the employer could not have filled
it with a domestic worker, there is at least a need. Second, depending
on the relative point value for a job offer, it alleviates the concern
that a country could accumulate skilled immigrants but have no jobs
for them to fill. 174 By merely awarding more points, rather than
making a job offer a prerequisite, the United States can give
preference to those economic immigrants that will be employed and
therefore more likely to succeed in the labor force, but not completely
bar jobless skilled immigrants that contribute human capital.
Second, the United States should award more points for certain
advanced degrees that are specific and useful to the immigrant's
prospective occupation. Many point systems do not discern between
the relative economic value of advanced degrees, but this is an
important predictor of the immigrant's economic success.17 5 Volume
of education is not necessarily indicative of economic success. 176
Several advanced degrees in liberal arts, for example, may not make
a prospective immigrant any more likely to succeed than an
immigrant with just one advanced degree in a STEM area of study. 7 7
A U.S. points system should identify the relative economic values of
advanced degrees and award points accordingly.
Likewise, the United States should award more points for the
specificity of education to occupation. For example, if Immigrant A
has an advanced degree in nursing and will work as a nurse postentry, and Immigrant B also has an advanced degree in nursing but
wants to pursue a career in entertainment, the U.S. points system
should award more points to Immigrant A for education because his
or her advanced degree is specific and useful to his or her prospective
work in nursing.
Such a system necessitates research into the relative value of
education. However, the United States could save the cost of such
research by looking at Australia's points system, which takes a
similar approach. 178 Additionally, the United States could create

174.
See id. (listing careers that require a Canadian license and are therefore
unavailable to many highly skilled foreign workers).
175.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
176.
See Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 5, at 124 (stating that
specificity of education to occupation is more indicative of economic success than
volume of education).
177.
See id. (explaining why Australia has opted to retain an occupation-based
points system rather than an education-based system).
178.
See supra Part II.B (noting that the most heavily weighted factor in the
Australian points system is the level of skill required by the applicant's occupation).
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certain bright lines whereby advanced technical degrees are assigned
more point value than general liberal arts degrees.
Finally, it should be noted that awarding more points, rather
than banning immigrants with certain degrees, strikes a compromise
between the two goals for the U.S. points system: addressing the U.S.
labor needs by awarding more points for certain degrees that will
assist .a prospective immigrant in filling a labor need, without
completely foreclosing other economic immigrants with less
occupation-specific and nontechnical degrees.
B. A Helping Hand: Offering Immigrant Assistance Post-Entry
Another way the United States can ensure the immigrants
admitted through a points system are successful and use their talents
1 79
post-entry is by implementing an immigrant assistance program.
Assistance could come in various forms, including offering simple job
search support for immigrants that do not have an existing job offer.
Job search requirements could vary vastly from an immigrant's
departure country-even simple r6sum6 assistance could be
helpful. 180 For immigrants entering a profession, guidance in
navigating the credential requirements of the particular profession
could also prove helpful.i18
Administering immigration assistance would certainly create its
own costs, and the range and depth of services offered would have to
be balanced with budget concerns. Perhaps an application under the
points system could require a small administrative fee to cover the
cost of such a program. The benefit of reducing unemployment or
underemployment for immigrants post-entry could outweigh the
costs.
Of course, the necessity of an immigrant-assistance program
needs to be judged by the structure of the points system. For example,
state assistance would be superfluous if the United States required
immigrants admitted through the points system to have a current job
offer.182 A requirement that an immigrant have. family sponsorship
could also reduce the necessity of an assistance program, as the idea

See Trevelyan, supra note 36, at 15 (criticizing Canada's lack of
179.
immigration assistance post-entry).
See CV-USA, IAGORA, http://www.iagora.com/iwork/resumes/cvusa.html
180.
(last visited Dec. 28, 2012) (discussing the different expectations for r6sumbs in the
United States).
Underemployment can result when skilled immigrants are admitted, but
181.
their experience and degrees do not meet the professional credential requirements of
the receiving country. See Trevelyan, supra note 36, at 15 (noting instances when
immigrants with Ph.D.s in Canada become taxi drivers post-entry).
See Part W.A. (suggesting a U.S. points system should award more points
182.
for a current job offer, rather than require a job offer).

298

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 46:271

behind family sponsorship is that the family will provide that
assistance rather than the state. 183 But because this Note
recommends that an immigrant be awarded more points for a job
offer or family sponsorship in the application process, rather than
requiring those criteria, an assistance program would be a necessary
component for ensuring an immigrant's success.

C. Reducing Socioeconomic Discrimination
Lastly, a points system should not be the only means of lawful
immigration for a country, and the points system should also have
some socioeconomic-neutral criteria built into the point categories.
One of the strongest criticisms of points systems is that points
systems discriminate along socioeconomic lines.184 This concern can
be reduced if the United States retains viable means for entry outside
of the points system.
The United States should retain family unification, amnesty
provisions, and opportunities for temporary study as means for
entry.185 All of the immigration systems detailed above do this, and
set target immigration levels.' 8 6 But increasing caps or bans on these
other modes of entry creates viability concerns because countries no
longer offer a meaningful opportunity to immigrate outside of the
points system.' 87
These immigration alternatives should be viable optionsnoneconomic immigrants should have a true opportunity to gain
lawful entry-and should not be mere lip service. With economic
immigration increasingly accounting for the majority of immigrants
entering Canada and Australia,18 8 there is a valid concern that these
important alternatives are slowly being squeezed. The United States
should remain committed to these other, noneconomic immigration
goals. Its overall immigration scheme should serve a multitude of

183.
See Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardts supra note 5, at 106 (listing the two primary
benefits of family sponsors as aiding migrants' assimilation and minimizing the shortterm economic risk new migrants poses to the government).
184.
See generally id. ("Yet economic considerations alone cannot drive an
immigration policy in a democracy.").
185.
See id. at 100 (distinguishing economic immigration from other
immigration policy goals).
186.
See Ashkar, supra note 31, at 148 ("[Canada] recognize[s] four categories of
individuals eligible for landed-immigrant status: (1) family class; . . . (2) humanitarian
class; . . . (3) independent class, which comprises applicants who . . . are selected on the

basis of the points system; and (4) assisted relatives .... ); see also Yale-Loehr &
Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 5, at 118-19 (noting Australia's other immigration
categories).
187.
The United Kingdom, for example, suspended its Tier-III category for
uhskilled workers needed to fill temporary labor shortages, and it is unknown when
this suspension will be lifted. See Neal, supra note 72, at 101.
188.
See infra note 199.
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1 89
goals, with economic and labor needs being just one of those goals.
While noneconomic immigration policy is outside the scope of this
Note, it is a prerequisite for implementing a points system in the
United States.19 0
Another way policymakers could lessen the inherent advantage
for wealthier immigrants is by designing point criteria with some
socioeconomic-neutral criteria. Preference can be given to certain
intangible factors that also contribute to economic success, but are
less likely to be possessed solely by wealthy immigrants. 191 For
example, points could be awarded for attributes like creativity,
motivation, and resourcefulness, which are also important for success
in the job market, but are not possessed exclusively by wealthier
immigrants.1 92
Another wealth-neutral option is to offer points for family
sponsorship, a component that Australia has incorporated in its
points system. 9 3 There could be emotional and financial advantage
for immigrants that have family support in the receiving country
because it helps them adjust to their new country. 194 These
advantages could increase the likelihood that immigrants with a
sponsoring family member already in the United States will succeed
post-entry. 9 5
Of course venturing into this new territory raises its own
problems. Intangible characteristics, like creativity and motivation,
raise measurability concerns. 196 These characteristics are also
subjective, giving the officials that are applying the system more
discretion. Subjectivity is something a points system is designed to
reduce.19 7
Additionally, more research would have to be conducted to
understand if these criteria actually contribute to immigrants'
economic success and benefit the receiving country. At least with
family sponsorship, the current research does not show a strong link

See Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 5, at 132 (recognizing that
189.
immigration policy serves many purposes in a democracy).
See id. ("[Elconomic considerations alone cannot drive an immigration
190.
policy in a democracy.").
See id. at 102 (listing alternative criteria for points).
191.
Id.
192.
See id. at 105-06 (considering the benefits of family sponsors).
193.
See id. (noting some points systems award extra points for the presence of
194.
family members in the host country who are available to sponsor the applicant).
See id. (reasoning that the positive effects of a family connection could
195.
counteract an applicant's shortcomings in other areas measured by the points test).
See id. at 102 (noting the "limited predictive power" of intangible
196.
characteristics).
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
197.

300

VANDERBILT]OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL, 46:271

between family sponsorship and post-entry economic success. 198
However, it is at least a starting point for policymakers to incorporate
some non-socioeconomic dependent criteria when designing point
rubrics. No matter through what means non-socioeconomic-based
immigration is accomplished, it is important that immigrants from a
variety of backgrounds have a meaningful opportunity for entry
through the points systems, especially considering that economic
99
immigration is becoming the primary mechanism of immigration.
The proposed system also has important implications for illegal
immigration, 200 which is a large component of current immigration
debate in the United States.2 0 According to the scholar, Charles
Kuck, overly restrictive immigration policies might have the
unintended effect of increasing unlawful immigration and the
associated problems with undocumented immigrants. 202 If a large
group of prospective immigrants have no meaningful mechanism of
legal entry, they might very well turn to illegal means of entry
instead. 203 Therefore, maintaining the opportunity for legal
immigration for immigrants from varied backgrounds is important

See Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 5, at 106 (noting that the
198.
effects of family sponsorship are unclear).
In Canada, a majority of immigrants are now economic immigrants. See
199.
Gafner & Yale-Loehr, supra note 4, at 187. Similarly, economic immigration has grown
steadily in comparison to other forms of immigration in the past fifteen years in
Australia. See Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 5, at 118.
See Charles H. Kuck, How Current Law Discourages, Rather than
200.
Encourages, Legal Migration, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 1421 (2007), for argument that
the tight restriction on lawful immigration into the United States has actually led to
"the unprecedented rise" in illegal immigration.
Illegal immigration, or enforcement, receives much more media attention at
201.
the expense of debate of legalization policy. See, e.g., Andrew O'Reilly, Undocumented or
Illegal: Media Outlets Battle over Immigration Terms, FOX NEWS LATINO (Sept. 25,
2012), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2012/09/25/undocumented-or-illegal-mediaoutlets-battle-over-immigration-terms/ (discussing the problem of terminology in the
"controversial" debate over enforcement immigration policy); Rinku Sen, Immigrants Are
Losing the Policy Fight. But That's Besides the Point, COLORLINES (Sept. 17, 2012,
9:50 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/09/immigrants-are-losing-the political
fight but thatsbesidethe point.html (noting legislation in Congress has focused
more on enforcement and less on legalization since 2007); Dan Stein, Tighten Up:
Eliminate Incentives for Illegal Immigration, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 24, 2012),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/One-Minute-Debate/2012/0924/3-views-on-howUS-should-combat-illegal-immigration/Tighten-up-Eliminate-incentives-for-illegal(offering elimination of employment
immigration. -Improve-detection-and-removal
opportunities for illegal immigrants as a strategy to eliminate the incentive for illegal
immigration).
See Kuck, supra note 200 (connecting the three and ten-year bars on
202.
immigration to the United States for those who have previously lived there illegally to
a rise in undocumented immigration).
203.
See id. (explaining that the choice between complying with the law and
leaving family in the United States or "being forced underground but remaining united
with their families" leads many undocumented immigrants to stay illegally).
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not only for human rights concerns, but also to avoid exacerbating
illegal immigration.

V. A MEANS TO AN END: A U.S. POINTS SYSTEM CAN HELP
THE UNITED STATES BETTER COMPETE IN
A GLOBALIZED WORLD
A points system offers an array of potential benefits, both
procedural and substantive, for the U.S. economic immigration
scheme. 204 However, the United States should learn from the
shortcomings of other countries' points systems and adopt a points
system that is informed of the potential human rights, economic, and
pragmatic concerns. 205
It is clear that a points system is a highly effective means to an
end, but not an end itself. 206 Though human-capital accumulation
from highly skilled immigrants is important in ensuring the
continued vitality of the United States, 20 7 a points system must be
tied to the actual needs of the labor market to be effective and ensure
that the talents of these individuals are not wasted once they are
admitted to the United States.2 08 This is important not only to the
country as a whole, but also to the individual immigrants themselves,
who would likely be frustrated if they faced unemployment or
2 09
underemployment post-entry.
The United States can connect its points system with the
domestic labor market by identifying labor sectors that are
experiencing worker shortages and designing point categories so that
highly skilled immigrants that intend to work in those labor sectors
are given more points.2 10 In addition to improving the structure of the
points system, the United States can also better ensure immigrant
success by having a corollary immigrant-assistance program post-

See Nwokocha, supra note 2, at 55 (acknowledging similar "costs and
204.
benefits" of the United Kingdom's PBS and Canada's points system).
See supra Part III (describing the downsides of points systems and
205.
suggesting how the United States might structure a successful points system).
See supra Part III.C.2 (examining when points systems fail to produce
206.
advantages).
See Nwokocha, supra note 2, at 65 (noting the need to supplement domestic
207.
workers in STEM fields in order to continue U.S. leadership in industry).
See supraPart IV.A (suggesting that labor demand influences the design of
208.
a U.S. points system).
See supra Part IV.A (noting that when labor demand informs immigration
209.
policy, the result is an alignment of the country's human-capital needs and immigrants'
welfare).
210.
See supra Part IV.A.
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entry.21 1 Finally, it is also important for the United States to retain
viable alternatives to economic immigration through the points
system to ensure that the overall immigration scheme reduces the
possibility for discrimination and advances other, noneconomic goals
of immigration. 212
So long as the points system is carefully designed to advance a
dual goal of human-capital accumulation and fulfillment of domestic
labor needs, a points system can go a long way to improve the United
States' economic immigration system. It would also allow the United
States to better compete for human capital in a globalized world.
Carla Tabag*

211.
See supra Part IV.B (suggesting such immigrant-assistance programs as
job-search support and credential-requirements guidance).
212.
See supra Part IV.C (listing alternative means for entry, including family
reunification, amnesty provisions, and temporary study).
* Candidate for Doctor of Jurisprudence, Vanderbilt University Law School, 2013;
B.S. 2009, The University of Miami. Many thanks to the editorial staff of the
Vanderbilt Journal of TransnationalLaw for all of their helpful edits, comments, and
critiques. This is dedicated in loving memory of Roberto Tabag.

VANDERBILT

JOURNAL

of TRANSNATIONAL

-

LAW

We are pleased to announce the 2013-2014 Board Members for the
Journal of TransnationalLaw
BOARD OF EDITORS
2013-2014

SEAN PATRICK MAHARD

Editor in Chief
TAYLOR GRACE WEAVER

Executive ManagingEditor

ANDREW JAMES DEARING SMITH

Executive Articles Editor
LAUREN MARIE SULLIVAN

Executive Article
Selection Editor

BRIGHAM DIxsoN

Executive Authorities Editor

SARAH DORAN MURRAY

Executive Student Writing
Editor

JOSHUA A. FRANK

Executive Authorities Editor

RACHEL HORTON BEVANS

Executive Development Editor
KATHRYN ANNE TAYLOR

Executive Authorities Editor

MEGAN ELIZABETH ZINGARELLI

Executive Development Editor

SARAH GREY MCCROSKEY
KENNEDY R. MEIER
RACHEL COLLEEN STONE
MELISSA PEARSON TUTILE

Article Editors

DANIEL ZACHARY KAY

Notes Development Editor
NINA MAJA BERGMAR
EMMA TH9RtSE DOINEAU
YASMIN KARmI
HOLLY VIRGINIA RHEA

STEPHEN ALEXANDER FOWLER
ALEXANDER GEFER
THOMAS ANTHONY QUINN

Article Selection Editors

Student Writing Editors

Liz BERK
THOMAS WYATT Cox
KENTON FREEMAN
MICHAEL PAUL GIEGER

Authorities Editors

JONATHAN RONALD JASINSKI
MARK MURRAY
JESSICA FAWN NWOKOCHA
SARAH FINLEY SMITH

Authorities Editors

KELLEY ELIZABETH TOWNE
WALTER ANTHONY TRAUNER
Ross LINCOLN TURNER
EMMA ROSE WISCHUSEN

Authorities Editors

VANDERBILT

JOURNAL

of TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

\

The Vanderbilt Journal of TransnationalLaw (Journal)(USPS 128-610)
is published five times a year (Jan., Mar., May, Oct., Nov.) as part of the
International Legal Studies Program by the Vanderbilt University Law
School, 131 21st Avenue South, Room 047, Nashville, TN 37203. The
Journal examines legal events and trends that transcend national
Since its foundation in 1967, the Journal has published
boundaries.
numerous articles by eminent legal scholars in the fields of public and private
international law, admiralty, comparative law, and domestic law of
transnational significance. Designed to serve the interests of both the
practitioner and the theoretician, the Journalis distributed worldwide.
Articles submitted to the Journal for consideration should be doublespaced, on 8%/ x 11 paper. Please submit articles via e-mail in Microsoft
Word format or printed manuscripts by way of U.S. mail.
Subscriptions beginning with Volume 44 are $30.00 per year (domestic),
$31.00 per year (foreign); individual issues are $10.00 domestic and $11.00
foreign. Orders for subscriptions or single issues may enclose payment or
request billing, and -should include the subscriber's complete mailing address.
Subscriptions will be renewed automatically unless notification to the
contrary is received by the Journal. Orders for issues from volumes prior to
and including Volume 16 should be addressed to: William S. Hein & Co., Inc.,
1285 Main Street, Buffalo, New York, 14209.
Class "Periodicals" postage is paid at Nashville, Tennessee and
additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Program
Coordinator, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vanderbilt University
Law School, 131 21st Avenue South, Room 047, Nashville, Tennessee, 37203.
Please send all inquiries relating to subscriptions, advertising, or
publication to:
Program Coordinator
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Vanderbilt University Law School
131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, Tennessee 37203
Phone: (615) 322-2284
Facsimile: (615) 322-2354
email address: faye.johnson@law.vanderbilt.edu
The Vanderbilt Journal of TransnationalLaw is indexed in Contents of
Current Legal Periodicals, Current Law Index, Index to Legal Periodicals,
and Index to ForeignLegal Periodicals.
Cite as: VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.

